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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
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A difference is made between open and hidden or veiled government bankruptcies. 
The latter are happening if budget deficits are covered by substantial money creation 
leading to inflation. In this case non-indexed government debt loses its value and is 
inflated away. This path is not open, if the debt is not denominated in the national but 
in a stable foreign currency or in units of gold or silver. This is usually the case for 
debt owed to foreigners. But sometimes both kinds of government bankruptcies are 
occurring together. In the present paper several general qualitative hypotheses are 
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1. Introduction 
 
Where the payment of interest and the repayment of debts 
in self-inflicted devalued or ruined currency brings about 
an improvement of the fiscal situation, not an open but a  
veiled government bankruptcy takes place. Veiled 
government bankruptcy is the modern method of national 
bankruptcy. 
                                                                                       
                                                                                    (Terhalle 1931, my translation)  
    If a government becomes unable to meet its obligations, there exist several 
methods how to escape them. Either the debt or the interest on it is reduced more or 
less openly by government decree, or by raising the taxes on interest payments. 
Another method is to lower its real value by inflation. This is all related by a 
tautological  unpleasant financial and monetary relationship (Sargent and Wallace 
1981). Historically, whereas a ruler like Philip II. of Spain declared three open 
bankruptcies during the second half of the sixteenth century, the method of veiled 
bankruptcy has become more and more widespread during the last century. Philip did 
not touch the value of the Spanish currency, the piece of eight (peso de ocho) which 
had established itself as a leading international currency and became the precursor of 
the dollar.  
        Still, veiled government bankruptcies reducing the nominal value of debts by 
inflation were certainly not unknown even before the last century of inflation 
following the demise of the gold standard. Thus a well-known German encyclopaedia 
explained already before 1914 (Meyers Konversationslexikon 1907) that government 
bankruptcies may occur as follows: 
 
1)  Repudiation of government debts that is an announcement that the state would 
not pay back the total or parts of its debt or pay interest on them. Such a 
refusal happened in earlier times often when the government changed. The 
new government declared the debts incurred earlier to be illegal (some US 
states 1841, Denmark 1850, ... France during the revolution); 
2)  Discontinuation of payments for an indefinite period; 
3)  A unilateral reduction of interest ... that is without the creditors agreeing; 
4)  A unilaterally introduced higher taxation of interest amounting to a hidden 
reduction of the interest rate, which can also occur by interest payments in 
debased coins or paper money; 
5)  Issue of an excessive amount of paper money turned into compulsory legal 
tender. 
 
                                                              (Vol 18, p. 807 f., my translation)   8
 
      Point 5 obviously refers to veiled bankruptcy. The article goes on to mention as 
recent examples of government bankruptcies that of Turkey 1875, of several countries 
in Central and South America (here Argentina 1890 should be mentioned), Portugal 
1892 and Greece 1893. But other Balkan states faced the same problem in the decades 
before 1914: Serbia went bankrupt, too, and Bulgaria came near to bankruptcy. Only 
the situation of Romania proved to be more stable. 
      In the following we will undertake a comparative study of “open” and “veiled” 
government bankruptcies of Balkan countries before 1914, and of the relationship 
between national bankruptcy, inflation and devaluation. In doing so we have to 
differentiate between government debt expressed in national currencies and that 
denominated in foreign currencies, where the latter is mostly held by foreign 
creditors. For whereas the former debt can be reduced in real terms by inflation as 
long as the respective state has control of its currency, this is not true for the debt 
denominated in foreign money. Before 1914 most of this debt was expressed in terms 
of stable gold and silver currencies, like the French franc, the British pound and the 
German mark, which also scarcely fluctuated because of the gold standard among 
each other. This was different for Russia and Austria Hungary until the 1890s, which 
were for long periods on paper money standards during the 19
th century. 
 
  2. Developments in the Ottoman Empire until 1914 
We begin our comparative analysis by looking at the developments in the 
Ottoman Empire until 1844 that is before most Balkan states reached their full 
independence. As already shown by Pamuk (2004), the empire suffered from a 
substantial budget deficit during the first half of the 19
th century, which was mainly 
covered by incurring domestic debt and money creation. The latter led to substantial 
inflation and thus to a fall of the exchange rate (Figure 3.1). According to our 
definition the period is thus characterized by veiled bankruptcy. 
Unfortunately, no figures for government budget and the money supply are 
available. But we know that a substantial debasement of the Kurush took place. A 
look at our figure also reveals that one of the hypotheses we want to test is clearly 
supported by the empirical evidence. With the flexible exchange rate to the pound as a   9
result of the debasement, a substantial undervaluation of the Ottoman currency 





Sources: The development of prices and of some data for exchange rates has been provided by Sevket 
Pamuk in personal communication to the author, January 2, 2008). See also Pamuk (1999) and (2004). 
Most data for Sources: The development of prices and of some data for exchange rates have been 
provided by Sevket Pamuk in personal communication to the author, January 2, 2008). See also Pamuk 
(1999) and (2004). Most data for exchange rates are from Schneider, Jürgen, Schwarzer, Oskar and 
Denzel, Markus A. (1994): Währungen der Welt, Vol. VIII, pp. 108-112. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 
 
 
In 1843-44 the situation changed dramatically. The government took reforms 
to stop the debasement of the currency and to balance the budget. Its efforts to stop 
the decline of the exchange rate proved to be successful, for the new parity with the 
pound could be maintained until the First World War (Figure 2.3). However, after two 
years the budget again turned into deficit (Figure 2.2). This meant, of course, that the 
deficit had now to be covered by rising credit, mainly by borrowing abroad, since the 
inflation tax was no longer available. But foreign loans were necessarily denominated 
in stable foreign money, given the British gold standard. This meant that with ever 
increasing government debt open bankruptcy of the Ottoman state could not be 
avoided in the long run. We will return to this event later, when we analyze the open 
bankruptcies threatening all Balkan governments except Romania in the decades 
























































Figure 2.1: Development of Prices and of Exchange Rate 


















         
      Source: See Figure 2.1 
 
Source: personal communication to the author by Sefket Pamuk, December 2007. 
 
We now turn to the development of prices and exchange rate as a consequence of 
these fiscal and monetary policies. According to our hypotheses we would now expect 
at least a removal of the undervaluation of the kurush compared to the British pound, 
and perhaps even an overvaluation since the Ottoman Empire suffered from a stronger 
increase of prices than the United Kingdom. And indeed, the price level is strongly 
moving ahead of the stabilized exchange rate in the years soon after the reforms. This 
is quite in tune with other historical experiences. Subsequently we see a tendency of 







































































































































Figure 2.3: Development of Prices and Exchange Rate 

















purchasing power parity. With the beginning of the new century, however, another 
rise of the price level can be observed. Does this mean that an overvaluation of the 
kurush was still present in 1913?  
To answer this question we have to take up two points. First, the developments 
sketched in Figure 2.3 do not take into account that a substantial undervaluation was 
present in 1843, so that the stronger rise of the price level might just have removed 
this. Looking at the data we find that until 1913 the price level rose to 1291.89 and the 
exchange rate to 1376.63, with the base set equal to 100 for 1799. Given the empirical 
problems with the cost of living index and the selected base year, the small remaining 
„undervaluation“of about 6% may be just an artifact. 
     The second point refers to the development of price levels in the stable countries of 
the center. For they have to be taken into account for problems of purchasing power 
parities. I have looked up the figures for the cost of living index for Switzerland. And 
indeed, the above picture does not change. For the Swiss index remained stable for all 
practical purposes in the long run. If we set the earliest figure for 1811 equal to 100, 
the index reached 100.58 in 1913. 
So, we can draw the cautious conclusion that either purchasing power parity 
was restored for the kurush before the First World War, or a slight undervaluation 
remained. 
  
 3. Fiscal and Monetary Developments in Four Balkan Countries 
We turn now to developments in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece and have 
first a look at the development of government budgets. We learn several facts from 
Figure 3.1. First, Greece and Serbia showed the most critical budgetary situations. 
Second, times of severe financial distress seem to occur for Greece around the 1880s 
and the late 1890s and for Serbia around the early 1880s and around 1900. Third, 
Greece was experiencing the strongest budget fluctuations among the four countries. 
Fourth, the Bulgarian financial situation looks precarious around the late 1890s and 
the first years of the new century, but seems to be better than that of Greece and 
Serbia. Finally, Romanian government finances became never dangerous, since 
budget deficits were soon compensated by surpluses. Neither an open nor a veiled 
government bankruptcy ever threatened.    12
 
 




3.1 Romanian Developments 
      As a consequence of its sound government finances Romania was never 
motivated to manipulate its currency by debasement; its exchange rate could always 
maintain its parity (Fig. 3.2). At first look it seems also that an undervaluation of the 
leu occurred, which should only happen according to our hypothesis if the Swiss rate 




















                                                 
1 To take the Swiss cost of living index for the comparison seemed to be adequate, since both 




















































Figure 3.1: Development of Government Deficits/Expenditures 
































   Sources: For prices: See Figure 3.3. For exchange rates: National Bank of Romania, Reports 







Sources: For Romanian prices: Postolache, Tudor (Coordinateur Scientifique)(after2000): L'Economie 
de la Roumanie, Le XXe Siecle. Academie Roumaine, Institut National de Recherches Economiques. 
Les editions Expert, 319-330. For Swiss Cost of Living Index: Swiss National Bank: Historical Time 
Series, CD, 2007. 
Note: An unweighed arithmetic average of 27 items has been used to calculate the Romanian inflation. 
 




























































































































Figure 3.2: Development of Purchasing Power Parity and 

















This seems, however, not to have been the case (Figure 3.3). Now it may 
probably have been wrong to take 1887 as the base year. But we did so since no data 
were available for the exchange rates of the years before. With an assumed earlier 
stability of the rate
2 and taking 1877 as a base year, the red line would shift up 
strongly, suggesting an overvaluation of the leu, which diminished in time.  
        This would be in tune with our hypothesis, since the average annual rate of 
inflation in Romania was 1.4% compared to -0.54% for Switzerland. So we might 
again, like in the case of the Ottoman Empire, either have in the end some remaining 
overvaluation or an approach towards purchasing power parity, which would 
correspond to our hypothesis. We cannot be too certain about the result, since some 
deviations have to be expected, given the fact that for Romania we have only an 
unweighed arithmetic average of fourteen goods, mostly victuals. We see also greater 
fluctuations of the Romanian price index than of the Swiss CPI, which are probably 
caused by the higher volatility of food prices because of bad harvests altering with 
good ones. 
 
3.2 Greek Developments 
Greek developments have been well described by Lazaretou (1995). She 
describes several switches of exchange rate regimes as a consequence of budgetary 
problems leading on the one hand to veiled government bankruptcy and on the other 
to stabilization policies moving the exchange rate back to the old fixed parity. The 
periods of financial distress can be clearly seen by looking at the figures for the 
accumulated deficits in terms of annual revenues (figure 3.1). These are the years after 
1833, the 1880s and early 1890s and the late 1890s. Later financial stress is again 
developing with the two Balkan wars and the First World War. 
Given the work of Sophia Lazaretou (1995) our paper can limit its analysis to the 
validity of the hypotheses for under- and overvaluation. As she reports, Greece 
suspended the convertibility of its currency four times from 1833 to 1914, but 
returned always to convertibility with an exchange exchange rate fixed to the French 
                                                 
2  14.4 guilders of Austrian currency were paid for 100 Lei (equal to Walachian piasters) in Vienna in 
1842 and 15 in 1863 (Schneider et al. 1991, p. 412). This suggests a long-term stability of the Lei. 
 
   15
franc at a parity of one to one before the First World War (Table 1, p. 30). All 
suspensions of convertibility were caused by the financing of excessive government 
deficits by money creation. The government reverted several times to open 
bankruptcy but also used extensively money creation to finance its deficits and thus 
presumably also to reduce its domestic debt by inflation. The tendency of politicians 
and governments to incur deficits and to finance parts of them by money creation or 
debasement is a well known historical fact explained by public choice theory 
(Bernholz 2003, Chapter 2). Inflation and the abolishment of fixed exchange rates can 
thus only be prevented, if the hands of governments are bound by strong institutional 
safeguards. But given the international gold standard, it can be observed that weaker 
peripheral countries, not only the Balkan countries, but for instance also Argentina 
and Brazil always strove to return to a fixed parity. This has been explained as caused 
by the aim of politicians either to follow the example of the more developed countries 
of the centre (Bernholz 1987) or (and) to be able to restore their creditworthiness to 



































































































Source: Lazaretou  (1995), Table A1.   16
      In testing the hypotheses for under- and overvaluation of the Greek currency we 
have unfortunately to limit ourselves to the period after 1877. For data concerning the 
development of food prices and of the exchange rate are only available from 1877, so 
that the earlier periods of distress, namely in the years after 1833 cannot be examined. 





                Source: Lazaretou (1995), Table 3.4. 
                Note: Unweighed arithmetic average of food prices. 
 
 
      
We have seen (Figures 3.4) that fiscal distress developed in the 1880s, stayed 
until the early 1890s and returned in the late 1890s. This corresponds with the 
development of the exchange rate (Figure 3.5). Until the mid-eighties it remained 
relatively stable near its parity. But afterwards the parity could not be maintained and 
the exchange rate became flexible and moved up strongly by about seventy percent. 
The price level followed more slowly, so that a substantial undervaluation developed. 
With stabilization policies setting in around 1900 the exchange rate fell more 
drastically than the price level and purchasing power parity was restored when the old 
fixed parity was reached. This corresponds to the hypotheses to be tested. 
       By  contrast,  the  development  from 1877 to 1887 seems to contradict the 













































Figure 3.5: Development of Exchange Rate and 

















of the drachma should have developed. For since the price level fell, whereas the 
exchange rate remained relatively stable, this looks like an undervaluation. But this 
impression may be deceptive, since this development could be the removal of an 
earlier overvaluation. We cannot know as long we do not have figures for prices and 





                          Source: Lampe and Jackson (1982), pp. 212 and 234. 
 
3.3 Bulgarian Developments 
The Bulgarian fiscal developments were less favourable than those of 
Romania but better than those in Greece and Serbia (Figures 3.1 and 3.4). Periods of 
financial distress were limited to the late 1890s and the beginning of the first decade 
of the 20
th century and again to the times of the Balkan wars. They were also by far 
less severe than those of Greece (compare Figures 3.4 and 3.6). This is reflected in the 
development of the exchange rate since 1879 (Figure 3.7). In fact, the parity could be 
maintained until 1914. With the price level falling in the early 1880s an 
undervaluation developed. When it began to rise since 1902, the undervaluation was 
first reduced and then turned into an overvaluation. Both events are quite in tune with 






































Figure 3.6 Accumulated Government Deficits 











































beginning in the late 1890s led to problems with international creditors and whether it 
had something to do with an expansionary monetary policy.  
              
 
 Source: personal communications to the author by Kalina Dimitrova and Martin Ivanov of the   
Bulgarian National Bank and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 2007/08. For exchange 
rates see also Trifonoff (1930). 
              Note: Retail price index is based on 97 commodities. 
 
 






































Figure 3.8: Serbian Accumulated Deficit/ 






















































































Figure 3.7: Bulgarian Retail Price Index 

















3.4 Developments in Serbia 
As can be seen from Figure 3.8 there occurred three periods of fiscal stress in 
Serbia since 1881. Worst in the 1880s, then around the turn of the century and finally 
from 1909. Beginning in about 1901 we have a rigorous consolidation which even led 
to an accumulated surplus in the following years. 
Unfortunately, exchange rates were only available to me since 1886. If we 
look at food prices, we cannot find evidence of an inflationary development in the 
1880s (Figure 3.9), a fact which may be, however, a consequence of the earlier rise by 
about 40 to 50 % in 1869 and the 1870s, which was maintained later. Around 1889 a 
reduction of the price level can be observed which may be a consequence of the 
strong reduction of the accumulated deficit during that time. After that period, but at 




 Source: personal communication by Dragana Gnjatovic to the author of data provided by Mr.    
Sojic of the National Bank of Serbia. 
           Note: Unweighed arithmetic average. 
 
     For the years from 1886 and 1896, respectively, exchange rates for French franc 
and the Austrian guilder are available (Figure 3.10). They show that the exchange rate 
for the franc and the guilder, presumably expressed in paper dinars, since the agio or 











































Figure 3.9:Development of Food Prices in Serbia, 
















1908. This probably reflects a move towards the parity for the gold dinar, which is 
towards full convertibility. In this sense a stabilization effort for the Serbian currency 
was undertaken. Together with the rising level of food prices this led probably to an 
overvaluation of the dinar, quite in line with the hypothesis to be tested. But at least 
part of the divergence may be just a correction of an earlier undervaluation, though I 
believe that only a part of the divergence can be explained by such a correction, since 
in 1908 a premium of 20.26 % on the twenty dinar gold coin remained. It had fallen to 
this value from 23.1% in 1894. This is a reduction by 12.3%. By contrast the 
divergence of the development of food prices and exchange rate from 1896 to 1908 
amounted to more that 50% in 1908. But still, these are just speculative judgments as 






              
 Sources: For exchange rates for Austrian guilder: Statistical Yearbook for the Kingdom of Serbia, 
various issues; for agio on metallic dinar: Gnjatovich (1991), Table 6, p. 198. For prices: see Figure 
3.9. 
 Notes: The exchange rates for the French franc have been calculated by using the agio on metallic 





































 Figure 3.10: Development of Price Level and of 


















4.  Open Bankruptcies of Balkan Countries 
With a stable monetary policy and fixed exchange rates veiled government 
bankruptcy becomes impossible. The same is true if the debt or great parts of it are 
denominated not in the national but in stable foreign currencies. But foreign 
currencies were stable under the then prevailing gold standard. Given these 
conditions, an accumulation of debt at a rate higher than that of GDP must necessarily 
lead in time to open government bankruptcy. We have, therefore, to look into the 
respective experiences of the Ottoman Empire, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria which all 
showed fiscal distress during periods in which they were striving for stable monetary 
policies and had reached or were attempting to move towards fixed exchange rates.  
As shown above the Ottoman Empire introduced stable monetary policies and 
a fixed exchange rate already beginning in 1844 (Figure 2.2). But at the same time 
government deficits remained sizable, so that the international indebtedness rose. As 
had to be expected, open government bankruptcy followed on April 13, 1876. After 
several years of negotiations the international debt was reduced from 250 to 106 
million British pounds, and the interest rate to at least 1%, but with an annual 
amortization of 1/3 % of this remaining debt (Meyers Konversationslexikon, vol. 
19,1908, p.829). An international commission, the Conseil d'Administration de la 
Dette Publique Ottoman was created. It consisted of one private member from each of 
the following countries: Britain, Italy, France, Austria-Hungary and Germany. Several 
public revenues were pledged to serve the remaining debt and were administered and 
controlled by this commission (Meyers Konversationslexikon, vol. 6, 1904, p. 570). 
But in spite of these developments public finances did not improve much and, as we 
have seen, new fiscal distress arose in1888, 1896 and from 1908 to 1912. In 1906 the 
international debt amounted to 129.1 million British pounds (Meyers 
Konversationslexikon, vol. 19,1908, p.822). These developments pointed to a 











Table 4.1: Long-Term European Loans to Balkan Governments,                            
1864-1911 (Million French Francs) 
 
                                       Nominal          Effective       Nominal      Effective                                                  
                                       Amount           Amount         Interest        Interest                                                    
                                                                                           %                % 
1864-1889 
 
Ottoman Empire (1876)  6182.5 
Romania (1864)                722.7              518.9             5.6                7.8 
Bulgaria (1888)                  76.8                 71.4             6.0                6.5 
Serbia (1876)                      63.5                46.6              3.8                5.2 




Romania                          1009.4             779.2              4.4                5.7 
Bulgaria                            150.0              131.2             5.8                 6.6 
Serbia                                367.8              258.1             4.0                 5.7 




Romania                           951.8             880.0             4.9                   5.3 
Bulgaria                            522.0             564.0             4.7                   5.5 
Serbia                               555.0              476.0             4.8                   5.6 
Greece                                55.3                44.2             4.0                   5.0 
 
Sources: Lampe and Jackson (1982), Table 7.7, p.233. The 1876 figure for the Ottoman Empire and the 
1893 figure for Greece are from Meyers Konversationslexikon, vol. 19, 1908, p. 829 and vol. 8, 1914, 
p. 310, respectively. 
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                Table 4.2: Open  Government Bankruptcies of Balkan Countries 
 
Country                Year                Reduction of Debt            Reduction of Interest        
Foreign Control 
 
Ottoman               1876               From 250 to 160           To at least 1%         Yes 
Empire                                       million pound 
 
Greece                 1893                                                      By two-thirds           Yes 
 
Serbia                  1893                                                      First no interest,    Limited 
                                                                                            then 4 % 
 
Bulgaria     Near bankruptcy      New loan saved 




We have already seen that Greece suffered from similar problems from the 
beginning of its new existence in 1832, as well described by Lazaretou (1995). 
Convertibility at par was already abolished in 1848 because of an overissue of 
banknotes. From 1895 a stabilization of monetary policies began which ended with a 
return to the old one to one parity with the French franc. Before this time Greece had 
not only reduced its real debt denominated in the national currency and increased its 
revenues by an inflation tax, but also accumulated increasing debts denominated in 
foreign currencies. This led to open government bankruptcy in 1893. At this time the 
government debt had risen to 598 million French franc and to 152 million devalued 
paper drachmas. The government reduced the interest rate on the foreign debt one-
sidedly to one third during the next years . But when the fiscal situation worsened 
even farther because of the defeat by the Turks in 1897, the Greek government agreed 
to a European Financial Commission similar to that instituted for the Ottoman Empire 
(Meyers Konversationslexikon, vol. 8, 1904, p. 310). Its members were mandated by 
the governments of Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary. 
This commission had the right to control and to administer certain government 
revenues pledged for serving and amortizing the international debt (Meyers 
Konversationslexikon, vol. 6, 1904, p. 571). It also imposed a moratorium on the 
issue of new banknotes and mandated the withdrawal of two million drachmas a year 
from dirculation until the exchange rate reached par. These and other reforms led to   24
more healthy monetary policies and to an increase of the exchange rate of the 
drachma until it had reached its original parity with the French franc in 1909. And 
during this process the National Bank of Greece, led by the able Stephen Streit, was 
able to establish its independence from the government, whereas the government had 
still forced the Bank in 1891 to lend it most of her gold reserves (Lampe and Jackson 
1982, pp. 214 and 218 f.).  
    If we turn to Serbian developments a similar pattern emerges. We observe 
periods of financial distress in the 1880s, around 1900 and around 1910 (Figure 3.8). 
The situation became so difficult in 1893 that neither public officials nor the interest 
on government debt could be paid (Meyers Konversationslexikon, vol. 18, 1907, p. 
362).. As a consequence the debts were consolidated into a new loan with an interest 
of 4 % and a Serbian Autonomous Monopoly Administration created in 1895. It 
controlled and administered several government revenues including those of the state 
monopolies with the purpose to serve the interest and amortization payments on the 
international debt (Meyers Konversationslexikon, vol. 6, 1904, p. 570 f.). The Serbian 
National Bank was able to reassert herself against the government, and in this process 
the money supply was reduced by three million dinars and further note issues frozen 
until 1900 (Lampe and Jackson 1982, pp. 213 f. ) . As a consequence the exchange 
rate of the dinar rose substantially during the following years (Figure 3.10).      
       Let us finally consider the Bulgarian financial situation. It has already been 
shown that the exchange rate could be kept at par from 1890 to the outbreak of the 
First World War (Figure 3.7). Financial distress developed before 1914 only around 
the turn of the century. A new loan agreed on by parliament and prince in 1899 could 
first not be obtained in Vienna and then in France. Thus the salaries of the officers of 
the army and of the bureaucrats were cut by 7% in 1899, and 20-30% of them paid for 
two years in treasury bonds. The prince agreed to forego 50% of the payments he 
received by the state, and the government was entitled to issue an amount of 40 
million lev in treasury bonds. But the budgetary situation remained precarious, and 
led to additional insufficient savings by reducing the number of districts in 1901 and 
of the number of recruits in 1902. Thus it became necessary to convert government 
debts with the help of a new loan in the amount of 260 million lev in 1902. Only this 
new loan could help to bridge the remaining deficit (Meyers Konversationslexikon,   25
vol. 3, 1903, p. 588 f.). But the budgetary situation improved afterwards and no open 
government bankruptcy occurred. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Simple arithmetic relationships exist between government deficits, their financing 
in capital markets and through central banks and the money supply. High inflations 
have usually been caused by financing excessive government deficits which were 
financed by creating money. All inflations in Balkan countries before 1914 and that of 
the Ottoman Empire as well as the abolishment of their fixed exchange rates 
corresponding to monetary regimes based on gold or silver standards were caused by 
veiled government bankruptcies. They usually led to an undervaluation of the 
respective currencies. If, however, fixed exchange rates were maintained or restored, a 
tendency towards overvaluation of the currency or a removal of the earlier 
undervaluation took place.  
       Open bankruptcies also occurred several times because of excessive deficits 
financed by incurring foreign debt denominated in stable currencies. In several cases 
they were combined with fixed exchange rates or motivated their restoration. 
            Unfortunately a lack of data prevented in a couple of cases to come to a 
definite conclusion concerning the hypotheses tested.   26
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